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AIR LAW
LIABILITY LIMITATIONS OF WARSAW CONVENTION APPLICABLE TO THE
CARRIER'S EMPLOYEES
Reed v. Wiser
The Warsaw Convention' (the Convention), adopted in 1929,2
was designed to provide a uniform body of law to govern certain
aspects of international air transportation.3 Perhaps the most im-
portant objective of the Warsaw signatories, however, was to limit
the potential liability of an air carrier and thereby minimize the
crippling effects of large accident-claim recoveries upon the infant
commercial aviation industry.' Accordingly, Article 22(1) of the
I The Warsaw Convention Treaty (the Convention), which was promulgated as a result
of two international conferences, is formally known as the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12,
1929, 49 Stat. 3014, T.S. No. 876 (1934) (unofficial translation), reprinted in A. LOWENFELD,
AVIATION LAW CASES AND MATERIALS: DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 412-24 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT]. At the First International Conference on Private Air Law, held
in Paris in 1925, the International Technical Committee of Aerial Legal Experts
(C.I.T.E.J.A.) was founded. Ide, The History and Accomplishments of the International
Technical Committee of Aerial Legal Experts (C.I.T.E.J.A.), 3 J. AIR L. 27, 30 (1932).
C.I.T.E.J.A. subsequently prepared drafts of a multilateral agreement covering international
air flight, which became the foundation for the Convention. Id. at 36. For a complete discus-
sion of the Convention's historical background, see id. at 27-49. See generally Latchford,
The Warsaw Convention and the C.I.T.E.J.A., 6 J. AIR L. 79 (1935) [hereinafter cited as
Latchford].
2 Only 23 countries were signatories to the Convention of Oct. 12, 1929. Latchford, supra
note 1, at 79. By virtue of subsequent ratifications, however, more than 100 countries cur-
rently adhere to its provisions. See 2 C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, AIR LAW app. A, at 3-8
(3d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT]. The United States proclaimed
its adherence to the Convention on June 27, 1934. 49 Stat. 3013, T.S. No. 876 (1934).
To ensure uniform interpretation of its provisions the official text of the Convention was
promulgated in only one language-French. 49 Stat. 3000-13, T.S. No. 876 (1934). An unoffi-
cial English translation of this text, is embodied in 49 Stat. 3014-26, T.S. No. 876 (1934). See
Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 330 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
392 U.S. 905 (1968).
The Convention's preamble states in pertinent part that the signatories have
"recognized the advantage of regulating in a uniform manner the conditions of international
transportation by air." 49 Stat. 3014, T.S. 876 (1934) (unofficial translation). See, e.g., Block
v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 337-38 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 905 (1968). See generally Kuhn, Warsaw Convention on International Transportation
by Air, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 746 (1930); Sack, International Unification of Private Law Rules
on Air Transportation and the Warsaw Convention, 4 AIR L. REv. 345, 348 (1933).
See SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAW, WARSAW, OcTO-
BER 4-12, 1929, MINUTES 205 (R. Horner & D. Legrez trans. 1975) (remarks of Mr. Giannini)
[hereinafter cited as WARSAW MINUTES]. Protection of the emerging airline industry was
clearly the primary reason underlying United States ratification of the Convention. See
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
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Convention provides that "the liability of the carrier for each pas-
senger shall be limited to" a fixed monetary sum.5 Aggrieved parties
customarily seek redress only from the airline corporation in whose
favor the Convention's liability limitation clearly operates.' The
Second Circuit, in Reed v. Wiser,7 however, was recently confronted
with the question whether this limitation inures to the benefit of
corporate officials sued in a personal capacity.' In a case of first
impression at the federal appellate level,9 the court held that the
term "carrier,"' 0 as used in Article 22(1) of the Convention, includes
the employees of the carrier corporation and that the recovery ob-
tainable against those individuals is therefore governed by the stric-
tures of the Convention."
Dan Reed was killed while aboard a Trans World Airlines
(TWA) jet which crashed into the Ionian Sea.'2 Reed's representa-
tives thereupon commenced an action, alleging that a bomb negli-
gently had been allowed to pass through the airline's security sys-
tem and had exploded on board the aircraft, causing it to crash.'3
TRANSMITrING A CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES, S. EXEC. Doc. No. G,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 HARv. L. REV. 497, 499 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfeld & Mendel-
sohn].
5 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876 (1934) (unofficial translation). The original text of the
Convention provided for a maximum recovery of 125,000 francs. The commonly used dollar
equivalent is $8,300, a figure derived from 1933 currency exchange rates. See Clare,
Evaluation of Proposals to Increase the "Warsaw Convention" Limit of Passenger Liability,
16 J. AIR L. & COM. 53, 57 (1949); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 499. The Warsaw
Convention recovery limit has been augmented by the Montreal Convention, a private agree-
ment between numerous international airline corporations. See note 16 infra. For an excellent
discussion of the problems inherent in the calculation of liability limitations, see H. DRION,
LIMITATION OF LmAmLrrms IN INTERNATIONAL Am LAW nos. 141-67 (1954) [hereinafter cited as
DRION].
I See notes 40-55 and accompanying text infra.
7 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 399 (1977), rev'g 414 F. Supp. 863
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
555 F.2d at 1081-82.
Id. at 1082. The precise issue in Reed had been previously addressed by only the
District Court for the District of New Jersey in Pierre v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 152 F. Supp.
486 (D.N.J. 1957), wherein it was held that Article 22(1) protects only the carrier corporation.
See notes 40-44 and accompanying text infra.
11 Article 1, the Convention's definitional section, defines only the term "international
transportation." See 49 Stat. 3014-15, T.S. No. 876 (1934) (unofficial translation). Soon after
the Warsaw Conference, commentators identified certain difficulties that might arise as a
result of the Convention's failure to define its terms. One author was particularly concerned
with the vagueness of the term carrier, questioning whether classification as such requires
privity of contract. Sullivan, The Codification of Air Carrier Liability by International
Convention, 7 J. Am L. 1, 13-19 (1936).
" 555 F.2d at 1084-85.
,2 414 F. Supp. at 863.
'3 Id. at 864. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970), all federal court litigation stemming
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Rather than suing TWA directly, the Reed plaintiffs attempted to
recover damages from the corporation's President and Vice-
President for Audit and Security." The defendants denied any neg-
ligence on their part and also sought to invoke as a defense the
Convention's limitation of liability, 5 as modified by the Montreal
Agreement. 6 Holding that the liability limitations benefit only the
corporation, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion to
strike this defense, 7 but subsequently certified the issue for interlo-
cutory appeal.'
On appeal, Judge Mansfield, writing for a unanimous Second
Circuit panel, 9 reversed the decision of the district court and held
that airline corporation employees fall within the scope of the pro-
tective limitations embodied in Article 22(1).'" Beginning its analy-
sis with a comparison of the tort rules of various nations, the Reed
court acknowledged the common law principle that an aggrieved
party may maintain a cause of action against a wrongdoing em-
from the accident was transferred to the District Court for the Southern District of New York
by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in order to facilitate proceedings and provide
a convenient forum for all parties. In re Air Crash Disaster in the Ionian Sea on September
8, 1974, 407 F. Supp. 238 (J.P.M.L. 1974). For an excellent discussion of multidistrict avia-
tion litigation, see Martin, Multidistrict Litigation-A Panacea or a Blight?, 18 TRIAL L.
GUIDE 409 (1975). See generally Farrell, Multidistrict Litigation in Aviation Accident Cases,
38 J. AIR L. & CoM. 159 (1972); McDermott, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,
57 F.R.D. 215 (1973).
414 F. Supp. at 863-64.
" Id.; see notes 4-5 and accompanying text supra.
IS The Montreal Agreement is formally known as the Agreement Relating to Liability
Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol. Agreement CAB 18990,
approved by order E-23680, May 13, 1966 (docket 17325), Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966), reprinted in
DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 434-36. A private pact which has been adopted by
more than 100 international airline corporations, the Agreement does not supersede either the
Warsaw Convention or the Hague Protocol, done Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 (1955),
reprinted in DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 425-33. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 4, at 446-52. It does, however, increase to $75,000 the maximum liability estab-
lished at Warsaw and Hague, for which amount the carriers are absolutely liable. The Agree-
ment came about in part, as a result of a threat by the United States to withdraw from the
Convention, due to the overly restrictive nature of its liability limitation provision. See
generally id. at 586-96.
'7 414 F. Supp. at 870.
" 555 F.2d at 1081. The interlocutory appeal procedure is set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1292
(1970). Pursuant to § 1292(b), a court of appeals may exercise its discretionary powers to hear
an appeal where a district court certifies that an "otherwise unappealable" order involves a
"controlling question of law," the immediate adjudication of which "may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation." Id. See generally Note, Interlocutory Appeals in
the Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88 HnAv. L. REv. 607 (1975).
"' Judge Mansfield was joined in his opinion by Judge Meskill and Judge Van Graafei-
land.
11 555 F.2d at 1093.
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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1976 TERM
ployee, separate and distinct from any suit against the latter's em-
ployer.2 ' In light of this principle, limitation of the definition of the
term carrier to the corporate entity would have the effect of exposing
airline employees to unlimited liability. Judge Mansfield noted,
however, that such an interpretation would not have similar effects
under certain civil law systems which do not permit direct recovery
from individual corporate employees. 22 Emphasizing that "the Con-
vention was intended to act as an international uniform law, ' 23 the
Second Circuit therefore found it necessary to construe broadly the
term carrier as inclusive of employees, thereby equalizing the maxi-
mum liabilities of all persons affected by the Convention. 24 The
Reed panel was of the opinion that this interpretation would pre-
clude the choice of law difficulties and ensuant "judicial night-
mare" 25 that would be caused by a less expansive reading of Article
22(1) .2
The Second Circuit found support for its construction in Article
24 of the Convention, which provides that "any action for damages,
however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and
limitations set out in this convention." 27 Construing the phrase
"however founded" as pertaining to every suit arising from flights
governed by the Convention, irrespective of the defendant's legal
status as a corporate entity or employee, Judge Mansfield reasoned
that Article 24 indicates that the drafters envisioned actions against
airline employees.2 8 It was concluded that this language represents
an attempt "to prevent claimants from avoiding the provisions of
the Convention by suing the enterprise outside the contract of car-
riage."29 As additional support for its position, the court noted that,
21 Id. at 1083. That an employee is liable for his own negligent acts is an idea deeply
rooted in the common law. See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com. Corp., 337 U.S. 682,
694 (1949); Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575, 580 (1943); Quinn v. Southgate Nelson
Corp., 121 F.2d 190 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 682 (1941). See generally W. PROSSER,
LAW OF To'Rs § 93 (4th ed. 1971). A similar principle is recognized by many civil law systems.
See A. VON MEHREN, THE CIML LAW SYsTEM chs. 8-9 (1957). See also F. LAWSON, A. ANTON &
L. BROWN, Aios & WALTON'S INTRODUCION TO FRENCH LAW ch. X (3d ed. 1967).
1 555 F.2d at 1083, 1087-88.
2 Id. at 1083 (citation omitted).
24 Id. at 1087-88.
2 Id. at 1091 (quoting Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 520 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1975)).
" 555 F.2d at 1091-92 & n.18 (citing In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp.
732 (C.D. Cal. 1975)). The Paris Air Crash court was called upon to resolve complex choice
of law problems in a case involving 203 suits brought on behalf of 337 decedents from 36
jurisdictions. The court was confronted with five different recovery limitations, four choice
of law theories, and five methods of measuring tort damages. See 399 F. Supp. at 741-42.
49 Stat. 3020, T.S. No. 876 (1934) (unofficial translation).
555 F.2d at 1084-85; see note 29 infra.
21 555 F.2d at 1085 (quoting DRION, supra note 5, at no. 136). With particular reference
19781
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by virtue of the indemnification clauses which exist in a majority
of the employment contracts between airline corporations and their
employees, an unlimited recovery in tort against a negligent em-
ployee would be tantamount to an unlimited recovery against the
airline." Such a result, the Reed panel stated, would be inconsistent
with the purpose of Article 24 as well as the framers' intent to limit
airline liability under Article 22.1'
Judge Mansfield pointed out that the district court, in conclud-
ing that the liability of an airline employee is not limited by the
Convention, had relied heavily upon the language of the Hague
Protocol (the Protocol) and the absence of United States acquies-
cence thereto. 32 Promulgated as an amendment to the original
Convention,33 Article XIV of the Protocol specifically brings em-
ployees of a carrier within the ambit of the liability limitation.3 1
Focusing upon this provision, the district court had reasoned "that
[the] careful treaty drafters had omitted in Warsaw, then added
at the Hague. . .what defendants claim was always there. '35 More-
to the term "however founded," Professor Drion, the Netherlands representative to the Hague
Conference of 1955, stated that "a sound interpretation [of Article 24] leads to the conclusion
that any action brought against the carrier's enterprise as such, or against members of it who
can be considered part of the enterprise, are to be brought subject to the [liability limita-
tions] of Article 22." DRION, supra note 5, at no. 136.
An entirely different interpretation of Article 24, however, was offered by Professor Matte
in his air law treatise. N. MATrE, TRArTE DE DRorr ARiuEN-AiRoNAuriQuE 422-23 (2d ed. 1964).
Professor Matte averred that the phrase "however founded" was included only to ensure that
the Convention would govern all actions for damages without regard to whether they are
commenced by passengers, heirs, or personal representatives, or whether they sound in tort,
contract, or quasi-contract. Id. Construed in this manner, the provisions of Article 24 fail to
support the Second Circuit's position in Reed.
1 555 F.2d at 1089-90.
3, Id. at 1089.
- Id. at 1085-87.
" The Hague Protocol is officially known as the Protocol to Amend the Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw
on 12 October 1929, done Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 (1955), reprinted in DOCUMENTS
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 425-33. The Hague Conference was convened for the express
purpose of revising the Warsaw Convention. See generally Beaumont, The Proposed Protocol
to Warsaw Convention of 1929, 20 J. AIR L. & COM. 264 (1953); Reiber, Ratification of the
Hague Protocol; Its Relation to the Uniform International Air Carrier Liability Law Achieved
by the Warsaw Convention, 23 J. Am L. & COM. 272 (1956).
3, Article XIV of the Hague Protocol, done Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 (1955),
provides in pertinent part:
If an action is brought against a servant or agent of the carrier arising out of damage
to which this Convention relates, such servant or agent, if he proves that he acted
within the scope of his employment, shall be entitled to avail himself of the limits
of liability which that carrier himself is entitled to invoke under Article 22 [of the
Warsaw Convention].
414 F. Supp. at 867-68; accord, Pierre v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 486
(D.N.J. 1957). For a discussion of the Pierre decision, see notes 40-44 and accompanying text
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over, the lower courts had viewed United States opposition to the
Protocol" as a factor supporting narrow construction of the term
carrier .3  Rejecting this reasoning, the Second Circuit noted that
nonratification of the Protocol by the United States was prompted
only by that agreement's failure to increase sufficiently maximum
liability under the Convention. 38 Judge Mansfield discerned no indi-
cation of legislative or executive dissatisfaction with the Protocol's
express application of the liability limitation to the carrier's em-
ployees. 39
Existing authority furnishes little guidance in ascertaining the
intended scope of the term carrier. The issue whether an employee's
liability is limited under the Convention was first confronted in
Pierre v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.," wherein the District Court for the
District of New Jersey held that Article 22(1) operates to protect
only the carrier corporation.4' Reasoning that Article XIV of the
Hague Protocol, which specifically shields employees from unlim-
ited liability," was an addition to rather than a clarification of the
convention,43 the Pierre court concluded that the liability of employ-
ees of the carrier is "unaffected by the terms of the Warsaw Conven-
tion."44 The precise issue decided in Pierre was subsequently ad-
infra. Whether Article XIV of the Hague Protocol supplemented or merely clarified Article
22(1) of the Warsaw Convention was a point of some dispute among the Hague delegates.
See notes 57-61 and accompanying text infra.
See note 38 infra.
414 F. Supp. at 868 (citing Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 989 (1976)). In Day, the Second Circuit stated that "tihe
conduct of the parties subsequent to ratification of a treaty may. . . be relevant in ascertain-
ing the proper construction to be accorded the treaty's various provisions." 528 F.2d at 35.
1' 555 F.2d at 1086. The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency, Najeeb Halaby,
stated that while his agency generally favored the Hague Protocol, the Agency was displeased
with its failure to remedy the inadequate financial protection afforded to international air
passengers under the Warsaw Convention. Hague Protocol to Warsaw Convention: Hearings
Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations on Exec. H., 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 15, 19 (1965).
555 F.2d at 1087.
152 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957).
,' Id. at 489.
42 See notes 31-39 and accompanying text supra.
4' 152 F. Supp. at 489; see notes 57-61 infra.
" 152 F. Supp. at 489. The court recognized the various attempts that had unsuccessfully
been made to extend the protection of the Convention to the carrier's employees. Id. Appar-
ently, the Pierre court was of the opinion that these efforts reflected a realization by interna-
tional authorities that Article 22(1) limits the liability of only the carrier corporation. As
noted in Reed, the ultimate disposition of Pierre remains unclear. 555 F.2d at 1087 n.11. While
it appears that the case was settled by the parties before appeal, it is uncertain whether the
employee agreed to pay an amount greater than $8,300.
There seems to be no reported case in which a plaintiff has been awarded a judgment
against an employee exceeding the limit of liability applicable to the carrier in a Convention-
governed controversy. See id. One commentator has attributed the absence of such judgments
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dressed in only three judicial opinions. One district court, by way
of dictum, and one circuit court, sub silentio, have suggested that
the liability limitation of Article 22(1) is applicable to a carrier's
agents. 5 In contrast, a Canadian court has cited Pierre with ap-
proval, stating that "nothing in the [Convention] . . . even re-
motely suggests that the word 'carrier' is to be interpreted as includ-
ing employees of carrier."4
The analogous question whether other articles of the Conven-
tion are applicable to the carrier corporation's employees was pre-
sented to the Supreme Court, New York County, in Wanderer v.
Sabena.7 There, the court held that the agent48 of an airline corpora-
tion could raise as a defense the statute of limitations provision
contained in Article 29.11 In its opinion, however, the Wanderer
court cited no cases to support its conclusion. A federal district
court, in Chutter v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,5" agreed with the
Wanderer result, reasoning that "it is impractical to distinguish the
carrier from the community of persons whose joint activity is the
carrier's activity."'" The underpinnings of this position, however,
to settlements which are entered into by defendant-employees on the assumption that the
Convention's liability limitations afford them no protection. 1 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION Acci-
DENT LAW § 12.0213] (1974).
" In Coultas & Polak v. KLM Airlines, 1961 U.S. Av. Rep. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), the
District Court for the Southern District of New York, pursuant to Article 25, charged the jury
in a negligence suit that KLM's agent was protected by the $8,300 limit of liability unless
willful misconduct was shown. See note 73 infra. No reasons were given regarding this point
of law. The defendants were, however, found guilty of willful misconduct. Consequently, the
liability limitation was inapplicable by virtue of Article 25 of the Convention. Id. Similarly,
in KLM Airlines v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961), the
District of Columbia Circuit assumed, sub silentio, that the defendant's agents would be
protected by all terms and provisions of the Convention. As in Coultas, however, the defen-
dants were adjudged to have acted in a willfully hazardous manner. Hence, neither the
Coultas nor Tuller holdings would seem to be authority for the Reed decision.
'1 Stratton v. Trans Canada Air Lines, 27 D.L.R.2d 670, 674 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1961), affl'd,
32 D.L.R.2d 736 (B.C. Ct. App. 1962). Stratton involved a suit against a carrier and the
estates of the pilots employed by the carrier. The defendants sought to invoke the liability
limitations of the Carriage by Air Act, CAN. REV. STAT., ch. 45 (1952), (now ch. C-14 (1970)),
which is the Canadian embodiment of the Warsaw Convention. 27 D.L.R.2d at 671. The
matter of employee liability was addressed by the court despite its determination that the
flight was not governed by the Warsaw Convention. Id. at 674.
17 1949 U.S. Av. Rep. 25 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1949).
" For a discussion of the relationship between the terms "servant" and "agent," and the
import of these terms with respect to the application of the Convention, see note 73 infra.
" 1949 U.S. Av. Rep. at 26. Article 29 of the Convention, which provides for a 2-year
statute of limitations, makes no reference to the "carrier." 49 Stat. 3021, T.S. No. 876 (1934)
(unofficial translation).
0 132 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
5, Id. at 613; accord, DRION, supra note 5, at no. 136. The United States delegate to
the Hague Conference has denounced the rulings in Chutter and Wanderer. Calkins, Grand
[Vol. 52:210
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have been severely undermined by the Supreme Court's rejection of
the case upon which the Chutter court primarily relied.52 In contrast
to Chutter and Wanderer, the notion that the Convention's scope
is restricted to the corporate entity may be gleaned from the French
case of Ministre Public c. Billet.5 3 Billet involved an action civile in
which an airline pilot was the original defendant and the carrier
corporation was subsequently named as an additional defendant.
Although the court held that the venue provisions of Article 2811
precluded the exercise of jurisdiction over the carrier, nowhere was
it suggested that this defense might be available to the pilot-
employee. 5 Taken together, the foregoing cases seem to offer little
Canyon, Warsaw, and the Hague Protocol, 23 J. Am L. & COM. 253, 267 n.7 (1956). In support
of this position he reasoned that the minutes of the Convention reveal an intent on the
part of the delegates to govern only the legal relationship created by the contract of carriage,
i.e., the relationship between the passengers and the carrier corporation. Id.
52 The Chutter court extended the statute of limitations defense of the Warsaw Conven-
tion to employees by drawing an analogy between the Convention and the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. § 1300 (1970), as interpreted by the Fifth Circuit in A.M.
Collins & Co. v. Panama R.R., 197 F.2d 893 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952).
132 F. Supp. at 613. Collins held that the COGSA liability limitation provision pertaining to
carriers applied to an independent stevedoring concern acting as an agent for the corporate
carrier. The Supreme Court, however, in Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359
U.S. 297 (1959), expressly rejected the Collins decision, holding that the term carrier as used
in COGSA embraces only the shipowner. It was noted by the Supreme Court that an em-
ployee, not a party to the contract between his employer and the aggrieved third party, cannot
seek the benefit of any exemption clauses contained in the agreement. Id. at 305.
Although the Herd case was viewed by the district court in Reed as a "highly persuasive
analogy," 414 F. Supp. at 866, the Second Circuit distinguished Herd by stating that
"COGSA unlike the Convention, explicitly defines the term 'carrier,' and its definition does
not include independent stevedoring companies." 555 F.2d at 1092-93.
The general principle espoused by the Herd Court is, nonetheless, internationally recog-
nized. In Scruttons Ltd. v. Midland Silicones Ltd., [1962] A.C. 446 (P.C. 1961), the House
of Lords refused to allow a shipping carrier's agent the benefits of an exemption clause
contained in the carrier's contract with its client. Accord, Wilson v. Darling Island Stevedor-
ing and Lighterage Co., 95 C.L.R. 43 (Austl. High Ct. 1955). In a French case, it was held
that a provision limiting the airlines carrier's liability, contained in national legislation, did
not inure to the pilot's benefit. Judgment of Jan. 14, 1937, Cour d'appel, Lyon, [1937] 6
Revue Gn6rale de Droit Arien [R.G.D.A.] 148, affl'd, January 12, 1938 Cass. crim., [1938]
7 R.G.D.A. 91. According to one commentator, this case illustrates that it is not novel to
expose a carrier to a degree of liability different than that of its employees. M. KAmmINGA,
THE AIRcRAFT COMMANDER IN COMMERCIAL Am TRANSPORTATION 91 (1953) [hereinafter cited
as KAMMINGA].
Judgment of July 11, 1964, Trib. gr. inst., Versailles, [1964] 27 Revue Gen~rale de
l'Air et d'Espace [R.G.A.E.] 257, note E. du Pontavice, rev'd, Dec. 3, 1967, Cass. crim.,
[1969] D.S. Jur. 81, note P. Chauveau.
" 49 Stat. 3020-21, T.S. No. 876 (1934) (unofficial translation).
27 R.G.A.E. at 261-62. Following the reported text of a case, French reporters custom-
arily publish a discussion by experts on the state of the relevant area of the law. In the note
appended to the Billet case, Professor Emmanuel du Pontavice summarized the position of
the French courts concerning the applicability of the Convention's provisions to a carrier's
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to support the holdings of either the district court or the Second
Circuit in Reed.
Relevant legislative materials appear equally uninstructive
with respect to the intended import of Article 22(1).11 Reflecting this
paucity of historical materials, several noted authorities have
reached differing conclusions as to the status of an employee under
the Convention. Professor Ambrosini, a leading air law expert who
was a delegate at both the Warsaw and Hague Conferences, was of
the opinion that the Warsaw Convention regulates the liability of
the carrier, as well as that of its employees and agents.57 He sup-
ported this position by reasoning that "the carrier and his servants
employees. He stated:
I1 existe un contrat de transport abrien entre le transporteur et le passager et
ce contrat est soumis aux dispositions de la Convention de Varsovie, qui concernent
la compbtence, la prescription et la limitation de ]a responsabilit6. La Convention
de Varsovie ne fait pas b~nbficier les prbposds du transporteur de ces dispositions.
Le pilote ne peut se prdvaloir des stipulations du billet de passage lorsqu'il est
recherch6 par la victime en vertu de la faute qu'il a commise personnellement; il
ne peut invoquer le contenu du contrat de transport et notamment les dispositions
de la Convention de Varsovie qui r~gissent celui-ci.
C'est seulement le Protocole de La Haye du 28 septembre 1955, non applicable
& la cause, qui 6tend aux proposas le bbn6fice des limites de responsabilit6 prevues
par l'article 22 de la Convention ....
Id. at 271 (emphasis added). This passage translates as follows:
Where there is an airline transport contract between a carrier and a passenger,
the contract is subject to the provisions of the Warsaw Convention concerning
jurisdiction, application, and the limitations of liability. The Warsaw Convention
does not extend these provisions to the employees and agents of the carrier. The
pilot is not able to avail himself of the terms of the flight ticket when he is sued by
the victim of a wrong that he has personally committed; he cannot invoke the
contents of the contract of carriage, and especially the provisions of the Warsaw
Convention which govern it.
It is solely the Hague Protocol of September 28, 1955, which is not applicable
to this case, that extends to the employees the benefits of the liability limitations
as provided in article 22 of the Convention ....
Although the Reed court found Billet irrelevant in that the latter was governed by the
Hague Protocol, 555 F.2d at 1087-88 n.11, this conclusion appears to be inaccurate. The Billet
cause of action arose in 1956, 27 R.G.A.E. at 258, five months after France signed the Protocol.
The treaty was not ratified, however, until 1959, and was not in effect until 1963. See
SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 2, app. A at 5. It is submitted that Billet reflects an
interpretation of the Convention's scope which is dissimilar if not directly opposed to that of
the Second Circuit in Reed.
" The Second Circuit noted that "no discussion of the subject at issue here is to be found
in the record of the two conferences . . . at which the [Convention] was drafted." 555 F.2d
at 1085. The issue of employee liability under the Warsaw Convention was addressed, how-
ever, at the Hague Conference. See notes 57-61 and accompanying text infra.
" 1 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AIR LAW, THE HAGUE, SEPTEMBER, 1955,
MINUTES 220, ICAO Doc. 7686-LC/140 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HAGUE MINUTES].
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or agents [are], from the legal point of view, the same person. 5 8
The only other delegate who was present at both conferences, how-
ever, Professor Riese, has stated that the Convention unequivocally
governs only the liability of the air carrier and not that of its em-
ployees.59 According to this commentator, a broader interpretation
of the term carrier is untenable in view of the specific references to
servants and agents in other articles of the Convention." Similarly,
the majority of Hague Conference delegates who considered the
issue of employee liability believed that the term carrier in Article
22(1) embraces only the corporate carrier."1 The conflict concerning
the scope of Article 22(1) is not confined to the views of air law
conference delegates. The International Civil Aviation Organizaton
has recommended the adoption of a clause specifically limiting the
liability of the carriers' employees, believing that the absence of
such a provision would render employees liable in tort for unlimited
damages.62 Moreover, most, but not all, authorities in this area have
concluded that the framers of the Convention never meant to ad-
dress the issue of employee liability limitations.63 These ambiguities
" Id. Professor Ambrosini reiterated his view of Article 22(1) of the Convention at subse-
quent air law conferences. See, e.g., 1 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AIR LAW,
GUADALAJARA, AUGUST-SEPTEMBER, 1961, MINUTES 134, ICAO Doc. 8301-LC/149-1 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as GUADALAJARA MINuTES].
"' 0. PRIESE, LuFrREcHT 431 (1949). Professor Riese was the German delegate to a number
of air law conferences and a member of C.I.T.E.J.A. See note 1 supra.
11 0. RIESE, LUFTRECHT 431-32 (1949). Professor Riese has reemphasized his understand-
ing of the term carrier at more recent air law conferences. See GUADALAJARA MINUTES, supra
note 58, at 134.
1, Mr. Iuul, the delegate from Denmark, noted that the Convention dealt only with
contractual relationships; hence, employees could not invoke any of its terms since they are
not parties to the air carriage contract. HAGUE MINUTES, supra note 57, at 217. The United
States representative, Mr. Calkins, was of the opinion that "no case of an action in tort
against a servant or agent was governed by the Convention, which related to the liability of
the carrier towards passengers and shippers." Id. at 351. Similarly, Mr. Alten of Norway
reasoned that a servant's or agent's liability "could only be extracontractual and could be
judged only according to some applicable law of tort." Id. at 214.
62 2 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AIR LAW, THE HAGUE, SEPTEMBER, 1955,
DOCUMENTS 99, ICAO Doc. 7686-LC/140 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HAGUE DOCUMENTS]; see
KAMMINGA, supra note 52, at 92. For a discussion of the structure and scope of operation of
the ICAO, see T. BUERGENTHAL, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
ORGANIZATION (1969).
See P. BUCHER, LE STATUT JuRiDIQUE DU PERSONNEL NAVIGANT DE L'AERONAUTIQUE CIVILE
36 (1949); KAMMINGA, supra note 52, at 90-92; 0. KoFFKA, M. BODENSTEIN & E. KOFFKA,
LuPrvERKEHRSGESETZ UND WARScHAUER ABKOMMEN 269 (1937); M. MAScHiNo, LA CONDITION
JURIDIQUE DU PERSONNEL AERIEN 125 (1930); N. MATrE, TRArrI DE DROrr AERIEN-AERONAUTIQUE
422-23 (2d ed. 1964); 0. RIESE, LUFTRECHT 440-41 (1949); Beaumont, Need for Revision and
Amplification of the Warsaw Convention, 16 J. Am L. & CoM. 395, 401 (1949); Calkins, Grand
Canyon, Warsaw, and the Hague Protocol, 23 J. Am L. & CoM. 253, 267 (1956); Pratt,
Carriage by Air Act, 1952-Limitation of Air Carrier's Liability-Whether Servants of Carrier
Also Protected, 41 CAN. B. REv. 124, 134 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Pratt]. But see DRION,
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surrounding the intended meaning of Article 22(1) would appear to
weaken the Reed court's position that its holding "reflects the plain
meaning and purpose of the French Text."64
Basic tenets of statutory construction mandate that "a treaty,
whether strictly or liberally construed, should be interpreted to ef-
fectuate its evident purposes."65 Although the declared intent of the
Convention's framers was to establish uniformity in laws pertaining
to international aviation,66 there are indications that the scope of the
conditions established therein was to be restricted to the legal rela-
tionship between the passenger and the carrier corporation. While
noting that "the legal status of the captain of the aircraft and of the
personnel" are of obvious concern, the President of the Warsaw
Conference indicated to the delegates that "subsequent diplomatic
conferences will deal with these questions." 7 He went on to issue a
caveat to the Conference, directing the delegates to disregard the
employee question and focus upon the liability of the carrier.68 A
more tangible indication that the Convention was not meant to
control all aspects of Warsaw-covered litigation is found in five arti-
cles pursuant to which the law of the forum is to be applied in
resolving certain issues that might arise in actions involving passen-
gers and carrier corporations. 9 The existence of these provisions
tends to draw into question the notion, relied upon by the Second
Circuit,70 that the Convention's stated purpose of making uniform
international air law is to be heavily weighted in deciding the inter-
pretational issue presented in Reed.
The dangers of extrapolation from an agreement's general de-
sign are highlighted by the Supreme Court's statement that
supra note 5, at nos. 133-37; R. GAY DE MONTELLA, PRINCIPIOS DE DERECHO AERONAUTICo 560
(1950); M. LEMOINE, TRArE DE DRorr AiRIEN nos. 840-41 (1947); M. LITVINE, PR.CIS EL.MEN-
TAIRE DE DROIT AiRIEN nos. 234-35 (1953).
555 F.2d at 1092.
Id. at 1088 (citing Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 163 (1940)). See Factor
v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933); United States v. A.L. Burbank & Co., 525 F.2d
9, 12-14 (2d Cir. 1975); Board of County Comm'rs v. Aerolineas Peruanasa, S.A., 307 F.2d
802, 806-07 (5th Cir. 1962).
" See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
67 WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 4, at 14 (remarks of Karol Lutostanski of Poland).
SId.
69 Article 21 of the Convention provides that the law of the forum is to be applied in
determining the effect of contributory negligence. Article 24(2) states that the Convention
does not govern the issues of standing to bring suit or the allocation of judgments recovered.
Article 28 provides that cases are to be adjudicated according to the procedure of the forum's
courts. Article 29, while providing a uniform statute of limitations period nevertheless leaves
to the forum court the power to determine the method of calculating the period. 49 Stat. 3006-
07, T.S. No. 876 (1934).
7o See notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
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"treaties are the subject of careful consideration before they are
entered into, and are drawn by persons competent to express their
meaning, and to choose apt words in which to embody the purposes
of the high contracting parties." In accordance with this line of
reasoning, many leading authorities have limited their interpreta-
tion of the term carrier to the corporation.7 2 In part, these analyses
rely on the specific references to the carrier's employees that are
contained in Articles 20 and 25 of the Convention.7 3 Article 25(1),
for example, deprives the carrier of the Convention's liability limita-
tions in the event of "his" willful misconduct; Article 25(2) imposes
the same penalty on the carrier in the event of his servant's or
agent's willful misconduct.7 4 It would seem paradoxical to disregard
the importance of this choice of words in the Convention while
coincidently acknowledging the expertise of the drafters. 75 This
1' Rocca v. Thomson, 223 U.S. 317, 332 (1912); see 1A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTON § 32.09 (4th ed. 1972).
72 See authorities cited in note 63 supra.
Article 20(1) of the Convention provides that "Etihe carrier shall not be liable if he
proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that
it was impossible for him or them to take such measures." 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876 (1934)
(unofficial translation).
Article 25 provides in pertinent part:
(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this conven-
tion which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful
misconduct. . . . (2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of
the said provisions, if the damage is caused under the same circumstances by any
agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his employment.
Id. at 3020; T.S. No. 876 (1934) (unofficial translation).
The unofficial translation's use of the word "agents" may be somewhat misleading. The
official French text employs the word "pr6pos6s," a term which is widely recognized to
encompass both servants and agents. LAROUssE MODERN FRENCH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 584
(1960); see DRION, supra note 5, at nos. 118, 135, 195; Sullivan, The Codification of Air Carrier
Liability by International Convention, 7 J. Am L. 1, 36 (1936).
7' See note 73 supra.
7 If the term carrier is not limited to the corporate entity, then Article 25(2) seems to
become superfluous. Specifically, it has been stated that the mere existence of the term
"pr~poses" (servants or agents) in that article "contradicts the assertion that servants and
agents are covered by the word 'carrier' elsewhere in the Convention." Pratt, supra note 63,
at 128. Accord, KAMMINGA, supra note 52, at 91. Nevertheless, the French jurist, Lemoine,
has stated that the presence of the term "pr~posb" does not inexorably lead to the conclusion
that the Convention's framers meant to include only the corporate entity within the definition
of the'word "carrier." He noted that Article 20(2) exempts the carriers from liability for
damaged goods and baggage if it is shown that negligent pilotage caused the damage. As
Article 20(2) applies even where the carrier is also the pilot, Lemoine reasons that a narrow
interpretation of the term "carrier," excluding employees from its operation, would give rise
to an anomalous situation: the carrier would be shielded from liability for baggage and goods
when he is the negligent pilot, while a servant is exposed to liability under the identical
circumstances. M. LEMOINE, TRAITE DE Dnorr AERIEN nos. 840-41 (1947); accord, M. LrrvuN,
PRiCiS ELiMENTAIRE DE DROIT AiRIEN nos. 234-35 (1953).
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anomaly is nonetheless inherent in the Reed court's analysis.
It is apparent that the prevalence of indemnification clauses in
contracts entered into by carriers and their employees" greatly in-
fluenced the Second Circuit's decision in Reed." In these clauses the
carriers agreed to indemnify their employees against all
employment-related liability. Cognizant of the convention's com-
mitment to limiting the airline corporation's liability, the court
deemed it necessary similarly to limit the liability of the employees
by bringing them within the operation of Article 22(1) and thereby
preclude the unlimited carrier liability that would otherwise flow
from indemnification clauses. 78 Unfortunately, the Second Circuit
seems to have prejudiced its analysis by relying on these agreements
as a relevant factor in the interpretation of the term carrier. A
prerequisite to the adjudication of a corporate carrier's liability for
acts of its employees is the joining of the corporation as a party to
the action. Once it is named as a defendant, the corporate carrier
is protected by the Convention's liability limitation,79 irrespective
of whether an unlimited judgment is rendered against its employee.
In the absence of indemnification clauses, therefore, the limited
nature of the carrier's liability would be unaffected by resolution of
the question whether an employee's liability is restricted under Arti-
cle 22(1). With the advent of indemnification clauses, however, the
failure to extend the protection of Article 22(1) to employees could
subject carriers to liability in excess of that contemplated by the
Convention's framers. Viewed in this fashion, private indemnifica-
tion agreements clearly have altered the legal principles that were
prevalent at the time of the Warsaw Conference, and, as voluntary
78 Clauses indemnifying employees for claims arising from their own negligent acts in the
course of employment were virtually non-existent when the Warsaw Convention was adopted
in 1929. During the late 1940's, however, labor organizations called for employee protection
in the form of indemnification agreements with carrier corporations. See Resolution of the
International Federation of Air Line Pilots Association, 5th Conf., Brussels, 1950, ICAO Doc.
No. A4-WP/154 (1950) [hereinafter cited as IFALPA Resolution]; DRIoN, supra note 5, at
no. 134; KAMMINGA, supra note 52, at 92; 1 L. KREINDLER, AvIATION ACcDENT LAw § 12.02 [3]
(1974); The International Federation of Air Line Pilots Association is a private interest group
whose major objective is to advance the interests of international pilots in the world com-
munity. See 1 SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 2, at 76-77. In this regard, Switzerland
has required carriers to indemnify their employees for all liabilities incurred in the course of
their employment. Loi F~d6rale sur la Navigation Adrienne, 1 ROLF art. 70(2) (1950).
" See 555 F.2d at 1090, 1092-93.
78 Id.
,1 See, e.g., Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 989 (1956); Glenn v. Compania Cubana de Aviacion, S.A., 102 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.
Fla. 1952); Ross v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1949), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955).
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agreements freely entered into by airline carriers, 0 constitute an
extraneous factor which should not have been weighed in evaluating
the language of and the intent behind Article 22(1).
Rather than construing the term carrier in a manner consistent
with the circumstances and legal principles existing at the time of
the Warsaw Conference, it appears that the Second Circuit has
implemented the goals of the Conference's framers in a mechanical
manner. In so doing, the court relied upon voluntary actions be-
tween private parties which have altered the considerations and
factual bases that prompted international ratification of the Con-
vention. It is not untenable to conclude that the drafters of the
Warsaw Convention intended to protect only the corporation when
referring to the "carrier's" limited liability."1 Construed in this man-
ner, Article 22(1) would effectuate the ultimate purpose of the Con-
vention by minimizing the amount recoverable from the corpora-
" Since it appears that subsequent to the Warsaw Conference the airlines were aware of
the divergent interpretations given to Article 22(1), see, e.g., IFALPA Resolution, supra note
76, it cannot be said that carrier corporations were unable to foresee the possibility that
indemnification agreements would effectively eliminate the liability limitations of the Con-
vention.
81 On a policy level, the Reed court noted that to allow unlimited recovery from an
airline's employees would result in higher travel costs for passengers. 555 F.2d at 1082. The
socialization of risk, however, is a widely sanctioned and preferred alternative to the denial
of just compensation for injury. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Door, 411 F.2d 198 (9th Cir.
1969), wherein the Ninth Circuit upheld an Arizona statute which fixed the absolute liability
of the insurer upon the occurrence of an accident, notwithstanding material misrepresen-
tations made by the insured which induced the issuance of the policy. It was noted by the
court that "[i]nsurance companies can alleviate their situation by . . . increasing their
insurance rates to spread the cost over larger numbers of the . . . public." Id. at 201.
The concept of providing adequate injury compensation by assessing a general class of
persons is inherent in the "assigned risk" insurance plans which are in effect in every state.
See W. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERmALS ON THE LAw OF INSUFANCE 68-69 (1971). Pursuant to these
plans, each company doing business in a state is required to insure a certain percentage of
undesirable risks. Consequently, the likelihood of being injured by a financially irresponsible
citizen is decreased at the expense of the public at large. Id. at 71-75. These statutory schemes
have been sustained despite due process arguments advanced by preferred-risk insurers. See,
e.g., California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105 (1951).
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tion, while still allowing an aggrieved party to seek just recompense
from a negligent employee.2
Christopher Manno
" The most recent attempt to achieve a realistic recovery limitation is found in Article
VIII of the Guatemala City Protocol which proposes a liability limitation of approximately
$450,000. This proposed treaty, the purpose of which is to supersede the Warsaw Convention,
is officially known as the Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as
Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 September 1955. International Civil
Aviation Organization Doc. No. 8932 (1971), reprinted in DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra note
1, at 437-46. Although this protocol was approved by the President of the United States in
1971, it has yet to be ratified by the Senate and therefore has no effect as law. U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2. See Note, The Guatemala City Protocol to the Warsaw Convention and the
Supplemental Plan Under Article 35-A: A Proposal to Increase Liability and Establish a
No-Fault System for Personal Injuries and Wrongful Death in International Aviation, 5
N.Y.U.J. INT. L. & POL. 312 (1972).
